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Abstract:
The financial crisis of 2007-8 provides an opportunity to investigate which factors have a significant
impact on firms at different stages of the crisis. This paper considers this shock event along these
lines: impact of leverage on a firm can vary depending on timing of the crisis; firm are challenged to
invest as the crisis recedes; revenue growth can enhance and sometimes impede returns; choosing
to hold cash or not when a firm make the trade-off with investment and both the timing and
decision are important; investors, managers and shareholders perceive these actions and events
differently. Large cap US firms (as defined in the S&P 500) provide a stable sample to study these
questions; this paper uses ROA and Tobin’s Q (Q) as performance measures and analyzes how they
are impacted by debt, asset utilization, revenues and cashflow at different stages of the 2007-8
crisis. Using a cross-sectional regression analysis, the results show that firm performance (ROA),
consistent with previous studies, is inversely related to leverage. However, coming out of the
crisis, this reverses and leverage has a positive impact on valuation (Q) and is consistent with
the Pecking order theory of capital structure where profitable companies (with strong
cashflows) tend to finance investments from internal sources and therefore such companies
tend to be associated with lower levels of leverage (Myers, 1984; Myers & Majluf, 1984). This
paper also shows that while cashflow has a positive but declining impact on ROA over these
time periods and has a similar positive impact on valuation (Q), however, the estimate’s sign
changes to negative during the post-crisis suggesting that holding cash in an economic
expansion doesn’t support higher valuation. By contrasting the impact of these variables on
financial returns (ROA) and market valuation (Q) for large cap US firms during each of the three
phases of the crisis, we see anomalies that would otherwise not be apparent, and, in this way,
this study adds to the literature on corporate performance during a financial crisis.

Introduction:
The 2007-8 financial crisis began to build momentum during 2007 with the Federal Reserve
slashing interest rates, the collapse of Bear Stearns in early 2008 and subsequently Lehman
Brothers and Merrill Lynch in the fall of that year. The US economy, quickly followed by other
developed economies, went into recession. The US crisis deteriorated rapidly, with the
economic malaise spreading around the world through financial markets and international
banks and affected many economic sectors (IMF, 2001; Ahn, Cetorrelli and Goldberg, 2011;
Amiti and Weinstein, 2011). While the financial services industry initially felt the force of this
meltdown, the shrinking in available credit and loss of liquidity served to spread the effects of
the crisis into 2009 and, in Europe, even longer.
Several papers analyze the economic effects of the 2007-8 financial crisis empirically. Campello
et al. (2010) survey 1,050 CFOs in 39 countries in the USA, Europe, and Asia to directly assess
whether their corporate investment plans differ conditional on the financial constraints of the
firms. They show that a significant majority of financially constrained firms postponed or
cancelled their planned investments and show that more firms sold assets during the financial
crisis to fund their ongoing operations.
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This paper is based on financial data of S&P 500 firms, using public quarterly financial data for
the period 2004-2012, which encompasses the crisis period of 2007-9 as well as three years
before and after. My motivation in doing this paper was the absence of published research
focused on large cap US firms’ performance, as measured by financial and market returns,
showing the impact on these measures at different stages of the financial crisis.
Key findings:
-

Regarding the impact of leverage, consistent with current literature, performance (ROA)
is negatively correlated to leverage in all periods, however, significantly, the estimate
changes sign in the post-crisis recovery period for Q, implying that the market favors
borrowing to invest over the possibility of financial distress in this period of economic
recovery. This anomaly emerges only when comparing the same variable’s impact on
the two performance measures and segregating the crisis time frame into three phases.

-

Cashflows are positively related to ROA although the estimate values decline over time,
possibly as returns on cash holding are marginal if not deployed. Cashflow estimates are
high for Q prior to the crisis when there is a premium put on liquidity in a period of
uncertainty (pre-crisis); the estimate coefficient drops rapidly in the crisis period and
turns negative during the post-crisis recovery period, as investors reward drawing down
cash and investing for growth.

-

Revenues have a positive impact in all three periods on ROA, which is not unexpected
(although statistically insignificant after the crisis). However, the estimate changes signs
with Q and has a negative impact on valuation in the same three periods.

This study contributes to academic literature on corporate performance during a financial crisis
in two ways, first, by analyzing the impact of the same four variables on financial returns (ROA)
and market valuation (Q) for large cap US firms, the study highlights the contrast between the
financial (internal) and investor (external) views. Second, in disaggregating the 2004-12 period
into three specific phases around the crisis, this paper extracts unique anomalies, related to the
impact of leverage and cash holdings on firm valuation, particularly in the post-crisis economic
expansion period, which would otherwise not be apparent.
The rest of this paper will follow this outline: I will do a literature review in Section 2, and this
will lead us to Section 3 where I discuss my motivation and hypothesis. Section 4 explains the
details of Data Selection and shows Descriptive Statistics and Section 5. provides details of the
Empirical Methodology, Section 6 discusses the Results and Findings, and Section 7 has the
Conclusion. References and Bibliography and the Appendices are in Section 8.
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Section 2:
Literature review:
In reviewing the literature for this study, I concentrated on papers focusing on financial crises
or shocks as they relate to debt and leverage, cash flows and performance. Additional research
provided guidance in confirming the selection of dependent and independent variables for my
empirical work. The research papers below are categorized by these characteristics:
Leverage:
Opler and Titman, (1994). The authors studied highly leveraged firms in an economic downturn
and found that they were affected by financial distress more than firms with lower debt and
noted significant signs of economic distress. They also found that firms investing in R&D as well
as those in concentrated industries were not protected and did not benefit during economic
downturns. This paper was useful in guiding me to compare the impact of low and high debt
levels on growth and performance.
Demirguc-Kunt et al, (2015). This study of 277,000 firms in 79 countries from 2004-7 found that
even in countries that were not impacted by the crisis, firms experienced reduction in debt and
reduced maturity although this impact was less apparent in public firms. Countries with weak
legal and regulatory systems, as well as inefficient banks and monetary authorities had greater
deleveraging. Larger firms with access to capital markets and public listings were less likely to
face financial distress. Some parts of this paper, which focused on larger and listed firms,
provided insight on the use and impact of debt and leverage.
Harrison, Widjaja, (2013). This study updated the 1995 paper by Rajan and Zingales and focused
on US firms using leverage as the dependent variable in their models. In their findings,
consistent with the original work by Rajan and Zingales, tangible assets and the market to book
ratio had a stronger impact on capital structure during the crisis than prior. They showed that
profitability was less impactful than before the crisis. Revenue had the opposite impact
(negative) than before the crisis. This paper reinforced the use of Tobin’s Q as a performance
measure and pointed to linkage to the Pecking Order theory.
Tan, (2015). This study showed how leverage impacted firm performance during the Asian
financial crisis of 1997-8. The author used return on assets and Tobin’s q as proxies for firm
performance. Here, consistent with Opler (1994) and Asgharian (2002), the author found that
the coefficient for leverage was negatively related to performance and higher leverage firms
were more likely to face financial distress. Additionally, the crisis magnifies the negative
relationship between financial distress and firm performance. This paper pointed to the use of
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multiple performance measures, particularly Q and ROA, although its focus was on the Asian
countries.
Medina, (2013). The author focused on over 6500 firms in 48 countries to study factors that
had positive and negative impacts on their performance during the financial crisis. These
included factors at the firm level as well as at the country and sector levels. His findings show
that higher levels of short-term debt and leverage negatively impact sales growth in the
recovery, but higher levels of fixed assets were positively related. A depreciating currency
during the crisis also helped during the recovery stage. The paper also shows that the
macroeconomic framework critically matters for firm growth. Although this report was based
on a global sample, it reinforced the importance of debt and leverage, which was useful in
formulating my analysis.
Performance:
Hossain, Nguyen, (2016). This paper focuses on the oil and gas industry in Canada and looks at
capital structure, stock, and operating performance before, during and after the recent financial
crisis for a ten-year period (2004-2013). Comparing the ROE of high and low leverage firms,
they found the gap in performance was 6.5% (pre-crisis), 3.3% (crisis), and 6.7% (post-crisis).
They found that leverage has a strong and significant relationship with return on assets. Firms
with high cash reserves also perform better over this period. This paper showed the usefulness
of breaking out the crisis into three clear phases and while it was narrowly focused (O&G in
Canada), it provides a working framework for my paper.
Alghifari et al, (2013). This study aimed to determine the effect of Return on Assets (ROA) on
Tobin's Q, based on research in the food and beverage industry. This study concluded that,
consistent with Dodd and Chen (1996), Uchida (2006) Ulupui (2007) Carlson and
Bathala (1997), return on assets had a significant effect on Tobin's Q. This paper was useful in
understanding the relationships between the two dependent variables selected for my
regression analysis.
Cashflows:
Bierlen, Featherstone, (1995). This study based on panel data tested the impact of financial
constraints. Their findings indicated that debt levels had the biggest impact on credit
constraints; they studied the relationship between investments and cash flow for low-farms
and found that with low leverage, investments increased with higher cashflows. This study
provided insight into the impact of cashflows on investments and provided some analogy in its
use in down-business cycles.
Myers and Majluf (1984) and Titman and Wessels (1988) find that profitable companies (with
strong cashflows) tend to finance investments from internal sources and therefore such
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companies tend to be associated with lower levels of leverage. I was able to apply the Pecking
Order theory and its insights on internal cashflows when developing my empirical model.
Duchin et al 2010. This study of publicly traded firm comprises of 6,421 quarterly observations
for 3,668 firms and splits the data into pre and post periods related to the 2008 financial crisis.
They found that as the crisis got started, investments dropped significantly, with firms that have
low cash reserves or high short-term debt obligation showing the greatest decline. This paper
provided analytical insight on understanding the impact of cashflow in the crisis and the period
immediately preceding it.
Investments:
Bolton, Chen, Wang, (2009). In this study the authors found that as firms increased leverage,
the level of marginal investments inversely impacted incremental changes in their value (Q).
also find that financially constrained firms hold higher levels of cash as a precaution. This study
helped reinforce the benefits of using Q as a performance measure when considering the
impact of cashflows.
Abel, Eberly, (2011). The authors studied the relationship between investments and Tobin’s Q.
In this study, investment and the investment-capital ratio are positively related to Tobin's Q and
cash flow, even in the absence of adjustment costs or financing frictions. They showed that
investment and Q were positively correlated and that increase in revenue made positive
impacts on Q and investment. Although his study focused on family-owned firm, the use of ROA
and Q as performance measures provided a guidance in selecting it for this paper.
Campello, Graham, and Harvey, 2010. This study found that as firm experienced restriction in
their borrowing capacity they avoided investment opportunities. Their analysis showed that
firm facing financial constraints, reduced spending in technology, staffing and investments.
CFOs who were interviewed confirmed that the credit crisis of 2008 restricted their ability to
grow investment. This was consistent in the US Europe and Asia. Insights provided by this study
were invaluable in selecting the key independent variables in my paper.

Section 3
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT & MOTIVATION
Research on the impact of financial crises is quite substantial particularly in the areas of debt
and leverage. Most of these studies usually cover a broad range of firms (in size and location).
Others are more specific, covering a particular country, region, or industry. In these studies, the
authors mostly do not break down their analysis by size of firm and when they do, it is in
reference to how large and small firms in general differ in impact on a global basis. However,
when combining large and small cap firms, it is likely that the impact of factors like leverage,
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investments and cashflows can be different depending on the size of the firm. Based on the
literature review three opportunities presented themselves, one was to focus on large cap US
firms based on the S&P 500 as information pertaining to how they performed during the crises
was less clear as the findings were merged with the broader group of firms. The other was to
contrast two distinctive performance measures (ROA and Tobin’s Q) and hypothesize as to how
they would be impacted by similar variables. And finally, there was the opportunity to break
out the crisis into three distinct phases as the studies on large firms in the 2007-8 financial crisis
either studied just the event itself or compared the results before and after the crisis without
including any analysis on the period covered by the crisis itself.
My motivation in this paper was to fill in gaps presented by these opportunities and thus add to
the existing literature and analysis of crisis events. My paper does this through the study of two
distinctive performance measures: ROA and Tobin’s Q and how they are each impacted by the
same set of independent variables. The other unique aspect of this study is to disaggregate the
crisis period into three phases and particularly to include the actual crisis period.
My research questions focus on two issues:
-

I would like to know if these key variables have the same effect on a firm as it operates
before a crisis, during the crisis as well as after the crisis.

-

My research question is directed to whether the impact of these factors is the same on
ROA as on Q (both in size and direction).

Based on the above research questions, I am proposing two hypotheses for this paper:
Hypothesis 1: Leverage will have a different impact on the two performance measures, a
negative impact on ROA which measures investment returns but will have a positive impact on
Tobin’s Q which focuses on valuation. The basis for this hypothesis is the contrasting nature of
these two performance measures. The null hypothesis will be negative estimates for all three
periods for leverage impact on both performance measures.
Hypothesis 2: The impact of the estimates for ROA and Q will be consistent regarding asset
turnover but will diverge on operating variables like cashflow and revenues. I expect to see
opposite signs for the same variables for ROA compared to Q. By implication, I expect investors
to be focusing on future cashflows and growth while operating management will be less risk
averse.

Section 4
DATA SELECTION
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The two performance measures I have selected, ROA and Tobin’s Q (Tan 2015; Bierlen,
Featherstone, 1995) look at different aspects of performance: ROA is mostly internally focused
and uses financial accounting generated information, while Q is mostly influenced by the
market value of the firm which considers future cashflow from investments. Taking a lead from
academic papers about factors influencing these performance measures, I have selected
leverage, asset turnover, revenues and cashflows.
In studying firms during financial shocks, certain characteristics of corporate behavior tend to
stand out: a) debt and leverage fund the business but there is the risk of financial distress
(Harris and Raviv, 1991), b) Investment in assets and their productive usage, position the firms
to emerge from the crisis successfully, Duchin et al. (2010) but need to be timed to take
advantage of economic recovery and productively used, c) revenues or maintenance of market
share and d) cashflows, which can be deployed to manage operations Myers and Majluf (1984)
and Titman and Wessels (1988), service debt and invest for growth Duchin et al. (2010).
Accordingly, I used these variables to see how they impacted firm’s performance.
My analysis is based on financial data of S&P 500 firms using published quarterly financial data
reported by these companies from Compustat as well as share price information from CRSP
(Center for Research on Security Prices) through the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS).
In this paper we use a panel data sample and fixed effect regression model with firm (company)
and period (year) fixed effects. My final sample includes 3,048 quarterly observations over each
three-year period. With ROA and Tobin’s Q (following Chung and Pruitt (1994) calculation for
approximate Q) as dependent variables, I used the same four independent variables which are
recognized in published research, this included Leverage, Assets (normalized using Asset
turnover), Revenues (using the normal Log) and cashflow (normalized using cashflows/debt).
In this section:
Table 1 provides definitions for all the variables as well as the corresponding predictions in the
Hypothesis.
Table 2 has the descriptive statistics.
Table 3 shows the pairwise correlations for all the variables.
Table 1 – Variable Definitions and Hypothesized Predictions
Variable Name
Description of Variable
Dependent Variable
ROA

Tobin’s Q

The return on assets (ROA) shows profitable a company's assets are in generating revenue. ROA
is computed ROA = (Net Income)/(Average Total Assets)

Tobin’s Q uses approximate Q* = (MVE + PS + DEBT)/TA where MVE: market value of
common stock, PS: liquidation value of preferred stock and DEBT: book value of liabilities,
which equals (short-term liabilities – short-term assets + long-term debt).

Independent Variables ROA
Leverage

Hypothesized Prediction

This is the ratio of Long-Term liabilities to Total Assets.

Hypothesized Prediction
Negative in all three
phases
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Asset Turnover

This is the ratio of Revenues to Total Assets. It measures
the effective use of assets, the higher the multiple the
more effective the usage.

Revenues

This is the log of Total revenues.

Cashflow to debt

This is the ratio of cash flow to total debt

Positive in all three phases

Positive in all three phases

Independent Variables Tobin’s Q
Leverage

Asset Turnover

Revenues

Cashflow to debt

This is the ratio of Long-Term liabilities to Total Assets.

Positive in all three phases

Hypothesized Prediction
Negative in pre-crisis,
Positive in crisis and post
crisis

This is the ratio of Revenues to Total Assets. It measures
the effective use of assets, the higher the multiple the
more effective the usage.

Positive in all three phases

This is the log of Total Revenues.

Negative

This is the ratio of cash flow to total debt

Negative in all three
phases

* Based on Chung and Pruitt (1994)
The generally acceptable time frame for the financial crisis begins in 2007, reaches a peak in
2008 and extends to 2009 and I have included all 3 years for the crisis periods. For comparative
purposes I have taken the three-prior year, 2004-6 as pre-crisis and the three subsequent years,
2010-12 as post crisis. Keeping the time periods and independent variables consistent allows
for unbiased comparison across the three periods as well as between the two performance
measures, ROA, and Q.
Data is based on quarterly financials reported by firms and collated by Compustat. Using the
above criteria, the total number of firms which are included is: 254 firms with 3048
observations for each of the three phases.
Requirements for a company to be included as a sample are:
1. Not newly listed or delisted during the research period.
2. Availability of certain accounts in the financial statement during the period of research (total
assets, total current assets, earnings and book value per share, total short and long-term debt,
total liabilities, total current liabilities, total liabilities and stockholders’ equity, stockholders’
equity, sales, and total market value).
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3. Any changes to the legal structure of firms during this period has been incorporated by WRDS
into a single consolidated holding company.
Descriptive Statistics:
One feature that distinguishes this research with other empirical crisis period studies is the
choice of the time frame. In most studies covering this crisis, the time frame is divided into two
periods which are the period before financial crisis and the period after the financial crisis. This
paper emphasizes that the 2007-9 period of the actual financial crisis should be segregated as a
sub-period as it may specifically highlight the determinant impact of debt, cashflows and
investments on the two performance measures. Separating the crisis period from the pre and
post periods helps to highlight trends and anomalies which would otherwise be submerged.
The descriptive statistics in Table 2 provide additional detail for each phase of the crisis.
Table: 2
Pre Crisis
Leverage
Asset Turnover
Cashflows to Debt
ROA
Revenues
Pretax Profits
Tobin_Q
Total Assets
Long Term Debt

Crisis
Leverage
Asset Turnover
Cashflows to Debt
ROA
Tobin_Q
Revenues
Pretax Profits
Total Assets
Long Term Debt

Post Crisis
Leverage
Asset Turnover
Cashflows to Debt
ROA
Tobin_Q
Revenues
Pretax Profits
Total Assets
Long Term Debt

N
3018
3036
3036
3036
3030
3030
2523
3042
3018
N
3031
3035
3035
3035
2558
3023
3023
3036
3031
N
3027
3033
3026
3033
2559
3015
3015
3029
3027

Mean
0.193
0.921
0.198
0.148
21,523
2,722
1.509
56,208
8,874
Mean
0.212
0.909
0.187
0.139
1.242
25,698
2,665
70,485
12,702
Mean
0.220
0.865
0.176
0.138
1.146
27,110
3,290
77,859
13,343

Median
0.175
0.827
0.160
0.137
10,038
1,062
1.194
14,682
2,348
Median
0.193
0.836
0.154
0.134
1.012
11,604
1,123
17,043
3,218
Median
0.202
0.770
0.145
0.135
0.975
11,764
1,203
18,110
3,596

Lower
Upper
Std Dev
Quartile Quartile
0.107
0.270
0.128
0.434
1.206
0.653
0.078
0.267
0.185
0.089
0.197
0.092
5,266
20,452
37,769
425
2,344
5,566
0.813
1.816
1.149
5,636
33,344
172,580
722
6,237
27,271
Lower
Upper
Std Dev
Quartile Quartile
0.117
0.288
0.139
0.445
1.200
0.639
0.085
0.252
0.222
0.082
0.192
0.094
0.711
1.541
0.839
5,884
24,251
45,615
363
2,876
7,884
6,472
40,751
236,784
1,125
7,508
44,486
Lower
Upper
Std Dev
Quartile Quartile
0.124
0.299
0.136
0.402
1.142
0.657
0.082
0.236
0.157
0.086
0.184
0.087
0.703
1.482
0.642
5,816
25,080
48,563
363
3,136
7,136
6,951
48,048
257,600
1,446
8,815
44,965
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Table 3
Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Pairwise Correlation of all data (Pre Crisis)
Leverage
Asset
Revenues
Turnover
Leverage
1
Asset Turnover
Log Revenues
Cashflow

1%
-6%
-38%

1
19%
20%

Pairwise Correlation of all data (Crisis)
Leverage
Asset
Turnover
Leverage
1
Asset Turnover
Log Revenues
Cashflow

3%
-12%
-32%

1
19%
19%

Pairwise Correlation of all data (Post Crisis)
Leverage
Asset
Turnover
Leverage
1
Asset Turnover
Log Revenues
Cashflow

12%
-11%
-24%

1
20%
18%

Cashflows

1
-3%

1

Revenues

Cashflows

1
1%

1

Revenues

Cashflows

1
11%

1

As seen in the above table there are no coefficients of pairwise correlation larger than 0.8.
Thus, it can be concluded that multicollinearity problem is not an issue in these variables. These
correlation tables provide a view of the relationships among the variables. Leverage paired with
both Revenues and Cashflows have negative correlation, we see positive correlation with all the
other variables in all phases. The only exception to this consistency is the pairing of Revenue
and Cashflow in the pre-crisis period a time when you might want to preserve cash at the risk of
higher revenues/market share. Pecking order theory predicts the negative correlation between
revenues and cash with leverage.

Section 5
Empirical Methodology
In this paper we use a panel data sample and fixed effect model effect regression model with
firm (company) and period (year) fixed effects. In panel data used in this study where
longitudinal observations exist for the same subject; fixed effects represent the subject-specific
means. The fixed effects estimator is used to refer to an estimator for the coefficients in the
regression model including those fixed effects.
We use the statistical software package of SAS to examine the presence of significant
correlation between the independent variables and the dependent variable. The model
regression equation consists of a dependent variable (ROA and Tobin’s Q) and independent
variables (Leverage, Asset Turnover, Revenue, Cashflow/debt).
Page 11 of 30

The equations being used are:
a) 𝑌(t) ROA* = β1 Leverage**(𝑡-1) + β2 Asset turnover **(𝑡-1) + β3 Log Revenues# (𝑡-1)
+ β4 Cashflow**~ (𝑡-1) + ε
b) 𝑌(t) Tobin’s Q* = β1 Leverage(𝑡-1) + β2 Asset turnover (𝑡-1) + β3 Log Revenues (𝑡-1)
+ β4 Cashflow**~ (𝑡-1) + ε
The dependent and independent variables are based on models published used as indicated: * Landsman and
Shapiro, 1995, Mehran (1995), ** Titman and Wessels, 1988; Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999; Booth, 2001;
and Hall, Hutchinson Michaelas, 2004, # Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Sinan, 2010, ## Graham, 2000; De Jong, Kabir,
and Nguyen, 2008; Sinan, 2010, ~ Cashflow/Debt as proxy for Cashflow.

Section 6: Results
In this section, we will discuss the results based on the outputs of the above regressions. Table
4 has this summarized.

Table 4
ROA
Leverage

Pre

CRISIS

Post

Estimate

Estimate

Estimate

-0.0185 *

-0.1566 ***

-0.0291 ***

Asset Turnover

0.1879 ***

0.1850 ***

0.1174 ***

Revenues

0.0189 ***

0.0423 ***

0.0000

Cashflow

0.1011 ***

0.0973 ***

0.0531 ***

R-squared

0.9408

0.9094

0.9542

Tobin's Q

Pre

Leverage

-0.0836

CRISIS

Post

-2.5786 ***

0.3706 ***

Asset Turnover

0.7643 ***

0.7502 ***

0.4717 ***

Revenues

-0.5488 ***

-0.7271 ***

-0.2409 ***

Cashflow

1.0633 ***

0.1833

-0.0907

0.9247

0.8392

0.9356

Observations

3048

3048

3048

Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

R-squared
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The key finding of this study regarding leverage shows that in the post-crisis period, we get a
sign change in Q, clearly favoring borrowing for investment growth in this period of economic
recovery. While ROA is negatively correlated to leverage, with Q, the negative impact is
consistent only for the first two periods (the negative coefficient during the crisis increases 31x,
showing that the market is very sensitive to the risk of financial distress). This is a partial
validation of my first hypothesis.
In keeping with academic literature on leverage, we see that all periods show negative
estimates for ROA. This rises 8.5x during the crisis period when the default risk is at its peak and
while it drops to pre-crisis levels after the crisis, the statistical significance is more robust.
Cashflows are positively related to ROA is implied by the negative impact of leverage, the
higher the cashflow, the less the need for borrowing (consistent with the Pecking Order
theory). but the estimate values decline, as returns on cash holding is marginal if it is not
deployed. Cashflow has a very high estimate for Q prior to the crisis when there is a premium
put on liquidity, this drops rapidly in the next two periods and is not statistically significant.
During the post-crisis recovery period, we see the estimate changes signs as investors reward
using cash for investments. This validates my second hypothesis.
Revenues has a positive impact in all 3 periods on ROA, which is not unexpected (although it is
statistically insignificant after the crisis). However, it has a negative impact on Q in all three
periods which seems counter-intuitive. Again, this is a validation of my second hypothesis.
Asset productivity has the same impact for both performance measures although we see that
the coefficients are much higher for Q than for ROA. The possible reason for the drop in
productivity post-crisis is increase in investments which will impact the denominator and lowers
the ratio.

Section 7
Conclusion
This paper compares the performance of large-cap firms before, during and after the financial
crisis of 2008. Literature suggested that the most predictive variables impacting performance
would be leverage, asset productivity, revenues and cashflows. Of these, leverage, with its
potential for financial distress gets the most coverage in research publications. A key finding of
this study is in Q, where we see a change in sign for leverage from negative for the previous two
periods, to positive in the post-crisis period. This is important because it strengthens the
explanatory power of the Pecking Order theory of capital structure which emphasizes the
importance of information asymmetry and predicts a negative correlation between profitability
(ROA in this case) and leverage. Pecking order theory also suggests a positive correlation
between market value (Q in this case) and leverage and we see this validated by the data in the
post-crisis period.
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The regression results for Q in post crisis period shows some significant differences compared
to the Crisis and Pre-Crisis periods. The most notable difference, as stated earlier, is the change
in sign of the coefficient of leverage during the post-crisis period. This points to the need for
financial flexibility coming out of a crisis to invest for the coming upturn. The second difference
in this post-crisis period is that the coefficient of cashflow which is positive during the two
preceding periods, turns negative in the recovery phase, pointing to the advantage of financial
flexibility (internal cashflow vs. external borrowings).
The results show that during the 2007-8 financial crisis, the Pecking Order theory has more
explanatory power than the other two theories considered. As Bharath, Pasquariello, and Wu
(2008) found in their research, firms which face higher information asymmetry have more
tendency to follow the prediction of Pecking Order theory. During the 2008 financial crisis, the
amount of information asymmetry was arguably larger than the other periods, resulting in the
increase of explanatory power of Pecking Order theory.
One limitation of this research is regarding the chosen turning point of the financial crisis
occurrence. There is no academic consensus on the exact timing of the onset of this financial
crisis exposing the risk of overlapping period in the data set. This paper selected the years 20079 as the period for the crisis to be consistent with the published literature on the time-line.
Although this research emphasizes the timing around the financial crisis, it does not provide an
inarguable exact point on when the financial crisis did start. Further research could be done
adopting a different timing period of the crisis.
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APPENDICES

Below are the variance inflation factors (VIF) outputs using Proc Reg in SAS. These factors measure the inflation in
the variances of the parameter estimates due to collinearities that exist among the regressor (independent) variables.
This calculation is done independently for ROA and Tobin’s Q and for each time period (Pre Crisis, Crisis and Post
Crisis). The ouputs are shown below:
Model: Pre-Crisis
Dependent Variable: ROA Return on Assets
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Model: Pre-Crisis
Dependent Variable: Tobin’s Q
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Model: Crisis Period
Dependent Variable: ROA Return on Assets

Page 23 of 30

Page 24 of 30

Model: CRISIS PERIOD
Dependent Variable: Tobin’s Q
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Model: POST CRISIS
Dependent Variable: ROA Return on Assets
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Model: POST CRISIS
Dependent Variable: Tobin’s Q

Page 29 of 30

Page 30 of 30

